MARCH 22 — I agree if someone were to say that the prime minister should not be dragged into the issue of temple land ownership and management to avoid turning a legal matter into a political game.
The 2019 case of Ramachandran a/l Meyappan & Ors v Chellapan a/l K Kalimuthu & Ors decided by the High Court at Shah Alam is instructive on the law on indefeasibility against adverse claim to the title.
The case concerns Sri Maha Mariamman Temple (the Temple) erected on part of a piece of land in the Mukim of Damansara, District of Petaling, Selangor (the Land).
The Plaintiffs claimed, among others, (i) that the Temple was built in the 1880s by the Plaintiffs’ ancestors when they worked for the “Seafield Rubber Estate”; (ii) that on August 16, 2005, the Selangor State Executive Committee had confirmed that the Temple would remain on the Land; (iii) that there was a conspiracy between the First Defendant and the Fifth Defendant to, among others, demolish the Temple and obtain vacant possession of the Land by fraud, unlawful and/or improper means.
The First Defendant was the purported Chairman of the Management Body of the Temple and the Fifth Defendant (a company) was the registered owner of the Land.
Reliance was placed by the Plaintiffs on Hindu customary law and legitimate expectation of the Temple’s devotees (Devotees).
On whether the Plaintiffs’ claim discloses a cause of action against the Fifth Defendant, High Court Judge Wong Kian Kheong ruled as follows:
“The Management Body of the Temple has the constitutional right ‘to acquire and own property and hold and administer it in accordance with law’. In other words, the Management Body can only acquire proprietary rights in the Land in accordance with the National land Code (NLC). Furthermore, NLC is intended by Parliament to be a code of law which is comprehensive (Ibrahim Ismail & Anor v Hasnah Puteh Imat & Ors [2004]).
“In this case, the Fifth Defendant is the registered owner of the Land and has rights under Sections 92(1), (2)(a) to (d) and 340(1) NLC.
“The [Plaintiff’s claim] did not allege any of the vitiating circumstances in Section 340(2)(a), (b) and (c) NLC which will render defeasible the Fifth Defendant’s registered title to the Land. Accordingly, the [Plaintiffs’ claim] does not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the Fifth Defendant regarding the Land.”
I agree if someone were to say that the prime minister should not be dragged into the issue of temple land ownership and management to avoid turning a legal matter into a political game. — Pexels pic
The learned judge then referred to Section 341 NLC and said:
“Section 341 NLC has been applied by Raja Azlan Shah CJ (Malaya) (as His Majesty then was) in the Federal Court in Sidek bin Haji Muhamad & Ors v The Government of the State of Perak & Ors [1982] 1 MLJ 313, at 314. It is clear that by reason of Section 341 NLC, the Management Body, the Plaintiffs and any of the Devotees cannot acquire any proprietary right in the Land solely by reason of their occupation of the Land.
“The Fifth Defendant’s [title to the Land] is conclusive under Section 89(a) NLC (on conclusiveness of the register document of title). I cannot accept the averments regarding fraud, illegality, impropriety and the alleged conspiracy against the Fifth Defendant because the Fifth Defendant is entitled to exercise any one or all of the statutory rights regarding the Land as conferred by Sections 92(1), (2)(a) to (d) and 340(1) NLC.”
With regards to the Plaintiffs’ reliance on Hindu customary law, the learned judge said:
“I am constrained to reject any reliance on Hindu customs at the expense of the NLC. [According to] the definition of ‘law’ in Article 160(2) of the Federal Constitution, a custom or usage can only be enforced if it can be shown that the custom or usage has the ‘force of law’.
“There is no proof that Hindu custom has the force of law in this case. In any event, any custom or usage cannot override the codified provisions of NLC regarding the rights of a registered proprietor of land which are guaranteed under Article 13(1) of the Constitution.”
On legitimate expectation of the Devotees, the learned judge said:
“The doctrine of legitimate expectation has no application in the realm of private law [which is governed by contracts and the common law duty of care].”
It was plain and obvious that the Plaintiffs’ claim did not disclose any reasonable cause of action against the Fifth Defendant. On this ground alone, the Plaintiffs’ action should be struck out.
The above, again, is instructive on the law on indefeasibility of title to a land against adverse claim to the title.
* This is the personal opinion of the writer or publication and does not necessarily represent the views of Malay Mail.
